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The economic impact of the Somali diaspora on Somalia, speci cally
those based in North American and Europe, has been amply
documented. The biggest economic in uence comes in the form of
remittances that make up a large share of the country’s economy. The
potential and real economic impact of COVID-19 in various Somali
regions has also been addressed by several recent blogs: in Puntland
and Somaliland. In this blog I want to address how the economic
impact of COVID-19 is affecting the state-building project in the country
by undermining one of the key features of this project: domestic
revenue generation of the Federal Government of Somalia. The blog
focuses on Mogadishu and the Federal Government whose reach,
including ability to raise revenue, is largely limited to Mogadishu.
The Federal Government of Somalia relies overwhelmingly on donor
support to help it pay for its civil servants and the meager social
services it provides. With capacity building support from donor
countries and a desire to gain a modicum of  nancial independence it
has been trying to increase the domestic share of its revenue. Several
factors, however, severely limit its ability to increase domestic revenue.
These include, the limitation of the FGS’s reach into Mogadishu, lack of
clarity on revenue sharing between the federal government and federal
member states, ine ciency and corruption within the FGS, and lack of
legitimacy which hampers the willingness of the population to pay taxes
to the government.  Despite these shortcomings the government has
been making slow progress in increasing the domestic share of its
budget. In what follows I highlight several arenas of economic activity
where the government has been able to generate income but which
have now been disrupted by COVID-19.
Remittances
A major impact of the pandemic has been on the money those in the
diaspora send to support relatives and friends in Somalia. It is
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estimated that the Somali diaspora sends US 1.5-2 billion  dollars to
Somalia annually. These remittances constitute 25-40 percent of the
country’s economy. Most of this money comes from the Somali
diaspora based in Europe and North America. Since Somalia does not
have a banking system that is linked to international institutions,
Somalis have to rely on hawalas,  Money Transfer Operators (MTOs)
whose original business model and success was based on trust and
lineage based identi cation.  Somali MTOs are capable of wiring
money to almost everywhere in Somalia, and are expanding their
operations to neighbouring countries especially those that have large
Somali populations. MTOs used to use regular banks to wire money to
Africa before collecting and distributing it to their various branches.
This all changed after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. and
the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT). Due to fears and
allegations that some of the money sent through MTOs was used to
support terrorist organisations like al-Shabaab almost all the banks
refused to do business with them and closed their accounts. The banks
wanted to avoid the scrutiny that would come from doing business with
MTOs. As a result, Somali MTOs could no longer wire money to Africa.
In response they began sending carriers with cash in suitcases to
deliver the money to Dubai from where it was dispersed to different
parts of Africa. Since 2010 this is how the Somali diaspora sent
remittances to Somalia. But with the stoppage of international air travel
due to COVID-19 the diaspora’s ability to send remittances back home
has been severely curtailed since March 2020.  Remittances have
fallen as much as 50% in April and May.  Though things have changed
recently with the easing of international travel, the UN still estimates a
17% percent drop in remittances for 2020.  This has had a huge impact
on the local economy and by extension the government’s ability to
generate revenue through taxation. For instance, estimates are that
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To lessen the economic pain the FGS has stopped taxing medical
services, medicine, and food purchases.
Adan Adde International Airport
According to interviews with members of the government, Mogadishu’s
main airport, Adan Adde International Airport, is, along with the port of
Mogadishu, one of the biggest source of domestic revenue for the
government. Turkish owned FAVORI LLC Airport Management and
Ground Handling Company has managed the airport since 2013. In
handing management over to the company the government argued that
this was necessary to enhance the security and image of Somalia’s
main airport and to ensure a more e cient running of it so as to
increase the government’s share of the money from this source. FAVORI
LLC thus took over the management of everything at the airport from
security to maintenance and agreed to split the pro ts with the FGS.
With the restrictions of international travel – Somalia imposed a ban on
international  ights in April – the money that  owed into government
coffers from the airport has decreased dramatically. Another
consequence of the reduction of relatively well-off visitors to
Mogadishu has been the drying up of business at hotels and
restaurants, another area where the federal government manages to
collect taxes.
Hotels and restaurants
The presence of international visitors in Mogadishu, mostly from the
Somali diaspora, that came with the onset of the state-building process
gave rise to another economic activity that is also taxed by the federal
government: securitised hotels and restaurants. Since the onset of this
project around 2012, heavily securitised hotels that cater primarily to
the diaspora and other well connected business people and politicians
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have popped up throughout the city. These hotels have restaurants and
cafes within them that are very expensive in comparison to local
establishments. Though not always successful, the government has
nevertheless been able to collect taxes from these establishments
relative to other areas of economic activity in the city. The stoppage of
international travel to Mogadishu due to COVID-19 has limited the
amount of business these hotels and restaurants have had and by
extension the government’s tax base. One might reasonably argue that
whatever business activity the diaspora presence in Mogadishu
normally generated will be unaffected by COVID-19 because as many
diaspora are prevented from coming to the city and an equal number
are prevented from leaving thereby keeping these hotel businesses
a oat. Such an argument, however, would be inaccurate in that it
misses a key feature of the Somali diaspora’s relationship with Somalia.
The Somali diaspora’s relationship with Somalia swings back and forth
between hope and despair and leads to constant movement in and out
of the city. There is usually hope around every election cycle and with
that hope they come to the city mostly in search of opportunities in
government, the NGO world, and in business ventures. People come to
Mogadishu having saved enough funds to cover their expenses while
they explore opportunities. A small minority might secure jobs or start
successful businesses but more often than not the hope turns into
despair for the majority as they exhaust their funds and are forced to
return to their adopted countries. This reality means that the diaspora
that have been restricted to Mogadishu due to COVID-19 do not have
the same spending power as when they  rst arrived and might
themselves be in precarious situations. Consequently, the various
businesses such as hotels and restaurants that relied on diaspora
presence and spending in the city have taken a hit since the onset of
COVID-19 as has the portion of the federal government’s revenue that
was generated through taxation of these businesses.
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Conclusion
It has been said that Somalia is one of the least prepared countries to
tackle the spread of COVID-19. There are almost no facilities to house
and track those that come down with the disease let alone trace and
track in order to control its spread. Less commented on, however, is
how this global pandemic might affect the fragile state-building project
in the country. There are clearly many interpretations of what state-
building actually means in the Somalia context, as well as the extent to
which it is actually taking place. That said, one of the key requirements
in establishing a stable and self-sustaining state in Somalia is to enable
it to become  nancially less reliant on international donors by
expanding its domestic revenue sources. Over the past several years
the FGS has attempted to accomplish this with limited but not
insigni cant successes, and the diaspora is a part of this in many
different ways, some of which have been indicated here. The economic
impact of COVID-19 threatens to undermine various sectors of the
economy that are crucial for government revenue collection thus
putting further strain on the state-building project in Somalia.
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